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SUDDEN IMPACT: THE EFFECT OF DOLAN V. CITY OF
TIGARD ON IMPACT FEES IN WASHINGTON
Joseph D. Lee
Abstract: As state and federal funding for public improvements steadily declines and is
outstripped by demand, municipalities are turning to impact fees to fund public projects.
However, the growth of impact fees has resulted in an increasing number of legal challenges
by developers and private land owners. This Comment examines the evolution of impact fees
in Washington and explores the legal concerns raised by the fees in light of Dolan v. City of
Tigard. The Comment concludes that some impact fee statutes satisfy Dolan's "rough
proportionality" test, while others do not adequately meet the U.S. Supreme Court's
requirements. Impact fee statutes that do not comply with the "rough proportionality" standard
should be invalidated.

Many local governments in Washington and across the country are
finding it increasingly difficult to pay for public improvement projects.
The demand for new roads, parks, and schools is rising faster than the
rate local governments can raise the required revenue. At the same time,
the Federal Government has significantly reduced its investment in local
public projects.' Local governments that traditionally have relied on
federal water, highway, and housing grants must now pay for public
improvements without this support.2 The problem is further intensified
by taxpayers unwilling to share the cost of providing services through
increased property taxes. Taxpayers see little reason to pay the way for
newcomers when higher taxes generally result in little or no increase in
their own service levels.3 The situation has led to a growing public
sentiment that new residential developments should "pay their own way"
by privately financing the construction and improvement of public
facilities.

I. Publicly funded federal capital investments fell from 3.4% of the gross national product in
1965 to 1.3% in 1984, as reported by Arthur Nelson from the Georgia Institute of Technology.
Department of Community Development, State of Washington, Paying for Growth's Impacts: A
Guide to Impact Fees 6 (1992) [hereinafter Payingfor Growth's Impacts].
2. For example, community development block grants, a one-time staple of local planning
budgets, were cut from $5.7 billion in 1981 to $2.7 billion in 1991. Sewer treatment construction
grants under the Clean Water Act were reduced from $5.4 billion to $1.6 billion over the same
period. William W. Abbott et al., Public Needs and Private Dollars: A Guide to Dedications and
Development Fees 8 (1993) [hereinafter PublicNeeds].
3. Gus Bauman & William H. Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of
American Practices,50 Law & Contemp. Probs. 51, 52 (1987).
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In light of the current revenue dilemma, local governments are turning

increasingly to impact fees as a way of financing new public projects.'
Impact fees are a type of monetary development exaction imposed on
developers by municipalities as a requisite for development approval.
Other development exactions include dedication of land or construction
of a community facility (e.g., a park or sewer).' Fees and other exactions
permit local governments to shift the burden of growth to the developers
and the residents of new developments by offsetting the cost of roads,
parks, schools, recreation facilities, and other public improvements.6
Although impact fees can ease the financial burden on municipalities,
developers have challenged the legality of the fees. Developers argue
that the fees will be used to benefit the entire community instead of their
specific projects. In addition, developers believe that the fees will
increase the cost of new development and affect their profits.' In
Washington, exactions have been challenged by developers as
unauthorized taxes,8 a taking of property without just compensation,9 and
a violation of due process.'
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the validity of development
exactions on two occasions. First, in Nollan v. Caliornia Coastal
Commission," the Court determined that there must be a "nexus"
between the exaction and the burden created by the new development for
the exaction to be valid. 2 Recently, in Dolan v. City cf Tigard,3 the
4. The terms "impact fee," "in-lieu fee," and "linkage fee" are commonly used to describe
different types of development exactions. Because the Washington statute uses the term "impact
fee," this Comment will use the term generally to describe the various types of monetary exactions,
5. James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes, Development Exactions 2-3 (1987).
6. For example, if a developer wants to construct an apartment complex, the local government
may request land for a nearby park or require the payment of a fee as a condition for approving the
necessary permits.
7. Douglas R. Porter, Will Developers Pay To Play?, in Development impact Fees: Policy
Rationale, Practice, Theory, and Issues 73, 74-75 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988) [hereinafter
Development Impact Fees).
8. See, e.g., Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 809, 650 P.2d 193, 195
(1982). The Washington Legislature later superseded the court's holding by passing Wash. Rev.
Code § 82.02.020 (1994).
9. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 593, 854 P.2d 1, 5 (1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1216 (1994); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 10, 829 P.2d 765, 770, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Guimont, 121 Wash. 2d at 593, 854 P.2d at 5; Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119
Wash. 2d 34, 51, 830 P.2d 318, 329, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); Sintra. 119 Wash. 2d at 10,
829 P.2d at 770.
11. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
12. Id. at 837.

Impact Fees in Washington
Court re-examined the issue. The Court not only affirmed Nollan's
"nexus" requirement, but spelled out how the concept should be
implemented: the regulating government must show the exaction is
roughly proportional to the burden caused by the new development. 4 In
essence, the Court's decision in Dolan created a new federal standard for
the imposition of impact fees and other development exactions under the
Fifth Amendment "takings" clause.' 5 As a result, state impact fee statutes
must satisfy the "rough proportionality" test.
This Comment examines impact fees in Washington in light of Dolan.
Part I provides a brief history of development exactions and discusses the
legality of imposing exactions on new developments. Part II describes
the history of Washington impact fees and asserts that Washington courts
generally have invalidated impact fees. Part II then briefly reviews
Nollan's "nexus" requirement and Dolan's "rough proportionality" test
and explains recent state court attempts to apply the "rough
proportionality" standard. Finally, part III analyzes the effect of Dolan
on Washington's four main impact fee statutes: development impact
fees, 6 transportation impact fees, 7 voluntary fees or dedications of
land, 8 and relocation assistance fees. 9 Although development and
transportation impact fees satisfy the Dolan Court's test, voluntary fees
or dedications of land and relocation assistance fees do not adequately
meet Dolan'srequirements.
I.

DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS

A.

A BriefHistory

Development exactions originated in the early 1920s2" about 25 years
after local governments generally began to regulate the use of land.2'

13. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
14. Id. at2319.
15. The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, made applicable to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const. amend. V.
16. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.02.050-.090 (1994).
17. Wash. Rev. Code §§ 39.92.010-.040 (1994).
18. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020 (1994).
19. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440 (1994).
20. Alan A. Altshuler et al., Regulation for Revenue: The Political Economy of Land Use
Exactions 16-18 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
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Land-use regulations were based on the "police power,"2 2 which grants
the government the authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
the public.23 In the early 1920s, the Department of Commerce published
model land-use acts to guide states in enacting land-use regulations. The
Standard Zoning Enabling Act, published in 1922, was widely adopted
and was the source of most of the early state zoning enabling acts.24
The first exactions were imposed to ensure that developers provided
sufficient on-site improvements. The Standard Planning Enabling Act
authorized local governments to require developers to build streets, water
mains, and sewer lines within the boundaries of their developments.
Although the real estate community initially challenged these required
dedications, the courts generally upheld them.26 Developers were not,
however, required to provide facilities for the general public such as
parks, treatment plants, and arterial roads. These project; were financed
out of the general revenue through local taxes.27
In the 1970s, a fundamental shift in public attitudes tcok place as the
environmental movement forced the public to reconsider the benefits of
uncontrolled growth.28 Local municipalities began to limit the number of
new developments. As cities restricted new developmenl in response to
the high cost of public facilities, growth control and management became
a priority. 2' Because public facilities still were considered a public
responsibility, no effort was made to shift the responsibility for public
infrastructure to the developers.3
The late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by a rapid growth
of new development. Federal tax cuts and increases in defense spending
22. The government's ability to enact land-use regulations under the "police power" is an
extension of the governmental power to abate nuisances. See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
668-69 (1887).
23. Susan M. Dembo, Development Exactions:A New Way To Fund State and Local Government
InfrastructureImprovements and Affordable Housing?,23 Real Est. L.J. 7, 8 (1994).
24. By 1923, 208 municipalities with 22 million residents, or 40% of the urban population, were
zoned. David L. Callies & Robert H. Freilich, Cases and Materialson Land Use 4-10 (1986).
25. See Altshuler et al., supranote 20, at 18.
26. See, e.g., Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (up'iolding dedication of
land for subdivision streets); Brous v. Smith, 106 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1952) (rejecting claim that street
dedications constituted a taking).
27. Thomas P. Snyder & Michael A. Stegman, Payingfor Growth: Using Development Fees To
FinanceInfrastructure5 (1986).
28. James E. Frank & Paul B. Downing, Patternsof Impact Fee Use, in Development Impact
Fees, supra note 7, at 3.
29. Snyder & Stegman, supranote 27, at 6.
30. Id.
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resulted in a shift in responsibility for infrastructure from the Federal
Government to state and local governments.3' The rising costs of
construction, coupled with the lack of tax revenues, forced many local
governments to consider new ways to finance capital facilities. Cities and
municipalities began to shift costs to new developments through the use
of impact fees.32 The increased use of impact fees and other exactions
during this time raised several legal questions.
B.

The Legality ofDevelopment Exactions

Development exactions generally have been challenged on three
grounds: (1) that the fees were unauthorized taxes; (2) that municipalities
lacked the authority to impose the fees; and (3) that exactions were not
sufficiently related to the new development under various state court
tests. When exactions first became widespread, local governments did
not have the statutory authority to impose them, and developers
challenged them on theories of unauthorized taxation or lack of statutory
authority.33 However, many states and local governments passed statutes
and ordinances authorizing the use of exactions as a means of
subdivision regulation.34
Developers not only challenged local governments' authority to
impose fees but also questioned whether there was a sufficiently close

31. Public Needs, supranote 2. at 13.
32. Snyder & Stegman, supranote 27, at 6.
33. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 318 P.2d 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) (holding that
municipality did not have statutory authority to require payment into park and school find as
condition for subdivision approval); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 810,
650 P.2d 193, 196 (1982) (holding that development fees constituted taxes and Legislature did not
grant authority to impose such taxes).
34. E.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 45-1973 (1994) (water supply fees); Cal. Gov't Code § 65995
(school impact fees), §§ 66000-66007 (fees for development projects), § 66477 (West Supp. 1995)
(park and recreation fees); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 380.06(15)(d)(1) (West Supp. 1995) (regional impact
fees); Ga. Code Ann. § 36-71-3 (1993) (development impact fees); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 46-142 (Supp.
1992) (impact fees); Idaho Code § 67-8204 (1995) (minimum standards for impact fees); I11.Rev.
Stat. ch. 605, para. 5/5-905 (1993) (procedure for imposing impact fees); Ind. Code Ann. § 36-7-41311 (West Supp. 1995) (impact fees); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 30-A, § 4354 (West Supp. 1994)
(impact fees); Md. Ann. Code art. 23A, § 44 (1994) (imposition of impact fees); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 324.11532 (1995) (impact fees); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 278B.280 (1995) (prohibited uses of impact
fees); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 53, § 10505-A (1995) (impact fees); Tex. Local Gov't Code Ann. § 375.141
(imposition of impact fees), § 395.011 (West Supp. 1995) (impact fees authorized); Utah Code Ann.
§ 11-36-201 (Supp. 1995) (impact fees); Va. Code Ann. § 15.1-498.2 (Michie Supp. 1995) (impact
fees); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 39.92.010-.040 (transportation impact fee), § 59.18.440 relocation
assistance fees), § 82.02.020 (voluntary impact fees), §§ 82.02.050-.090 (1994) (development
impact fees under Growth Management Act).
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relationship between the exaction and the development under several
state court tests. State courts have defined the necessary relationship in
different ways. While some state courts have required a strict or "close"
relationship, others have mandated less restrictive tests. In general, three
tests have emerged among state courts to describe the required nature of
the relationship between the exaction and the development: (1) the
"specifically and uniquely attributable" test;35 (2) 1he "reasonable
37
relationship" test;3 6 and (3) the rational nexus test.
The first test imposes the strictest standard by requiring that the
needed improvements be "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the
impact of the new development to validate an exaction. This test was first
expressed in Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect.38 In Pioneer Trust, the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated an
exaction requiring the developer to dedicate land for a school. The court
determined that the need for the school was created by the community as
a whole, thus, the school was not "specifically and uniquely attributable"
to the new development. 9 The court suggested that an exaction can be
justified only if it is necessitated by the development.4"
The most permissive of the three tests is the "reasonable relationship"
test. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek,4 the
California Supreme Court upheld a local ordinance requiring developers
to dedicate land or help pay for parks and recreational facilities. The
court held that an exaction is valid as long as "the amount and location of
land or fees... bear[s] a reasonable relationship to the use of facilities
by the future inhabitants of the subdivision."42 The court rejected the
notion that a strict relationship is necessary between the exaction and the

35. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799, 102 (1.1961).
36. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 612 (Cal.), appeal
dismissed,404 U.S. 878 (1971).
37. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442, 448 (Wis. 19.55), appeal dismissed,
385 U.S. 4 (1966). Most commentators recognize Jordan as the leading rational nexus case even
though rational nexus language was never used.
38. 176 N.E.2d at 802.
39. Id.
40. Later Illinois cases interpreted the "specifically and uniquely attributable" language to mean
that the exaction must be reasonably proportional to the needs generated by the new development.
Therefore, the strict requirement set forth in PioneerTrust is no longer generally followed in Illinois.
See Krughoffv. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 (Ill.
1977).
41. 484 P.2d 606, 612 (Cal.), appeal dismissed,404 U.S. 878 (1971).
42. Id.

210
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needs created by the new subdivision, indicating that the exaction is
valid even though the public may benefit incidentally from it.43
The rational nexus test offers a middle-of-the-road approach. In
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls," the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld exactions of land or in-lieu fees45 for schools and parks. After
balancing the needs of the community against the rights of the developer,
the court concluded that the exaction was valid because the evidence
"reasonably establishe[d]" that the municipality would need more
schools and parks as a result of the new development.4 6
The rational nexus tests lies conceptually between the "specifically
and uniquely attributable" test and the "reasonable relationship" test. The
rational nexus test is more restrictive on municipalities than the
"reasonable relationship" test because it limits the government's ability
to impose exactions to those necessitated by the development. The test is
less restrictive on local governments than the "specifically and uniquely
attributable" test because it makes developers responsible for a part of all
new facilities made necessary by their developments and not just those
that are specifically related to them.47
II.

THE EVOLUTION OF IMPACT FEES IN WASHINGTON

A.

Washington CourtsHistoricallyInvalidatedImpact Fees

Impact fees were met with resistance in Washington by developers
and private land owners. Efforts by local governments to impose the fees
were unsuccessful. In Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County,4 8 the
Washington Supreme Court invalidated impact fees as unauthorized
taxes. Snohomish and San Juan counties imposed fees on new residential
developments to help pay for parks, schools, roads, and fire stations
necessitated by rapid growth.49 The court found that if the primary
purpose of the fees was to raise revenue rather than regulate land, then
the fees must be considered taxes." Concluding that the fees were

43. Id. at 612 n.5.
44. 137 N.W.2d 442,448 (Wis. 1965), appeal dismissed,385 U.S. 4 (1966).
45. "In-lieu fees" are impact fees that are paid in lieu of dedicating land to the local government.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Jordan, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
Snyder & Stegman, supranote 27, at 57.
97 Wash. 2d 804, 810-11,650 P.2d 193, 196 (1982).
Id. at 805-06, 650 P.2d at 193-94.

50. Id. at 809, 650 P.2d at 195.
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intended to raise revenue, the court held the fees unconstitutional absent
express authority by the Legislature to impose taxes through impact
fees. 5
The Washington Legislature first authorized the use of impact fees to
a limited extent in 1982 by enacting section 82.02.020 of the Washington
Revised Code. Although this statute prohibits "any tax, fee, or charge,
either direct or indirect, on the construction or reconstruction of
property," it provides for "voluntary agreements... that allow a payment
in lieu of a dedication of land or to mitigate a direct impact that has been
identified as a consequence of a proposed development, subdivision, or
plat. ' 2 Impact fees also have been authorized to pay for new
developments,53 transportation improvements, 4 and relocation assistance
for low-income tenants.55
Since the Legislature has authorized the use of impact f.ees, developers
have argued that municipalities have exceeded the bounds of the statute.
In San Telmo Associates v. City of Seattle,56 the Washington Supreme
Court invalidated a Seattle Housing Preservation Ordinance (HPO) that
required developers to construct low-income housing or contribute to a
low-income housing ftud.57 The court concluded that the ordinance
constituted a tax and is prohibited under § 82.02.020.58 Similarly, in RIL
Associates, Inc. v. City of Seattle,59 the Washington Supreme Court
struck down a Seattle ordinance that required the payment of impact fees
to fund a tenant assistance program.60 The court determined that the
ordinance did not meet the requirements of § 82.02.020 and was
therefore invalid.6'
Washington courts have rejected impact fees on other grounds as well.
In Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle,62 the Washington Supreme Court reexamined Seattle's HPO that required developers to replace low-income

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 808, 650 P.2d at 194-95.
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020 (1994).
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.02.050-.090 (1994).
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 39.92.010-.040 (1994).

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440 (1994).
108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
Id. at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
Id.
113 Wash. 2d 402,780 P.2d 838 (1989).
Id. at 409, 780 P.2d at 842.

61. Id.
62. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 767 (1992).
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housing uprooted by development or contribute to a housing fund. The
court examined the ordinance to determine whether it was a taking of
property without just compensation or a violation of due process." In
remanding the case to clarify the facts, the court stated that if the
developer could show that the economic burden placed on the property
was so great that there was no viable use, then a takings claim would be
established.' Furthermore, under a due process analysis, the court noted
that Sintra's property could not be singled out as the main reason for the
lack of low-income housing in Seattle." The court held that the
"oppressive nature of the regulation" violated due process. 6
A similar due process argument was raised in Robinson v. City of
Seattle.67 The Robinsons also challenged the validity of Seattle's HPO
when they were required to pay fees for low-income housing. 8 The court
applied a substantive due process analysis to determine whether the HPO
was unduly oppressive. 9 In balancing the City's interests against the
Robinsons', the court concluded that the City possessed other, less
drastic methods of addressing the problem of homelessness." Thus, the
court held that the HPO was unduly oppressive and therefore violated the
Robinsons' rights to substantive due process.7
Although Washington courts have been reluctant to embrace impact
fees, they have upheld the fees in a few limited circumstances. In View
Ridge ParkAssociates v. Mountlake Terrace,72 the Washington Court of
Appeals upheld a local ordinance that required developers to construct or
pay for on-site recreational facilities in multiple-unit developments.7' The
court stated that the recreational fees were required to mitigate the direct
impacts of the new development.74 Because the new development would
place a greater demand on existing recreational facilities, the court

63. Id. at 10, 829 P.2d at 770.
64. Id.at 18, 829 P.2d at 774.
65. Id.at 22, 829 P.2d at 777.

66. Id., 829 P.2d at 776.
67. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 767 (1992).
68. Id. at 41, 830 P.2d at 323-24.

69. Id. at 54, 830 P.2d at 330-31.
70. Id.at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
71. Id.
72. 67 Wash. App. 588, 839 P.2d 343 (1992), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1016, 854 P.2d 42

(1993).
73. Id. at 598, 839 P.2d at 349.

74. Id.
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concluded that the fee was permissible to mitigate the impact of the
development.75
B.

A New Standardfor Development Exactions

Although many state courts have addressed the exaction issue, the
U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the issue on only two occasions. First,
in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,76 the Coxt set forth the
"nexus" test for development exactions. The Court later re-examined the
validity of exactions in Dolan v. City of Tigard.77 Even though Nollan
and Dolan discuss dedications of land rather than impact fees, the same
analysis can be applied to both land exactions and impact fees. While
Washington courts have invalidated fees on various grounds, future
analysis of impact fee cases also must involve consideration of the effect
of Nollan and Dolan.
1.

Nollan v. California Coastal Commission: The "Nexus " Test

In Nollan, the U.S. Supreme Court closely examined the relationship
between the exaction and the development. The Nollans owned
beachfront property along a public beach.7" They wanted to demolish a
bungalow that stood on the lot and replace it with a new beachfront
home. Although the Nollans requested the required permits from the
California Coastal Commission, the Commission would not grant the
permits unless the Nollans agreed to set aside a public easement across
their property that was adjacent and parallel to the beach.79 The
Commission argued that the new house would contribute to 'a "wall" of
public
the
would
prevent
that
structures'
residential
'psychologically... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby
that they have every right to visit."' ' 0 The Commission concluded that it
was necessary to offset this burden to the public by requiring the Nollans
to dedicate part of their land for an easement.8 '

75. Id.
76. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
77. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
78. 483 U.S. at 827.
79. Id. at 828.
80. Id. at 828-29 (quoting App. at 58).
81. Id. at 829.
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The Nollan Court invalidated the public easement requirement as an
uncompensated taking because the exaction of land and the impacts the
Commission claimed to be created by the proposed development lacked
the required "nexus. ' '82 The Court reasoned that the permit condition
must somehow help alleviate the problem caused by the new
development but found no relationship between a public easement and
the "psychological barrier" that prevented the public from viewing the
beach.83 The Court observed that the demanded easement would be
traversed only by persons already on the beach; it would not help anyone
perceive the beach from above the Nollans' property.84 The Court did,
however, suggest that requiring the Nollans to provide a viewing spot on
their property might have been permissible to alleviate the Commission's
concern about visual acess.8"
In defining the required "nexus," the Court refused to adopt any of the
state-court tests for exactions. The Court, however, did use language
similar to the "rational nexus" test in announcing that there must be a
close "fit" between the exaction and the problem created by the
development. 86 According to the Court, unless exactions are imposed to
alleviate the public burden stated by the municipality, they are invalid as
"'out-and-out plans of extortion."' 8 7 Thus, the Court required that
exactions be scrutinized to ensure they specifically
address problems that
88
development.
new
the
to
attributable
are
2.

Dolan v. City of Tigard: The "Rough Proportionality"Test

In Dolan, the U.S. Supreme Court re-examined the relationship
between exactions and the proposed development. 89 Dolan also involved
an exaction of land as a condition for approval of building permits.9"
Dolan planned to nearly double the size of her plumbing and electric
82. Id. at 837.
83. Id. at 838.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 836.
86. Id. at 838-39.
87. Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981),
overruledby Town of Auburn v. McEvoy, 553 A.2d 317 (N.H. 1988)).
88. See generally Nicholas V. Morosoff, "'Take' My Beach Please!": Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus ConstitutionalAnalysis of Development Exactions, 69
B.U. L. Rev. 823 (1989).
89. Dolan v. City ofTigard, 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994).

90. Id. at2312.
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supply store and to pave a parking lot on her property. 9' The City was
willing to approve the necessary permits on two conditions: (1) that
Dolan dedicate roughly 7000 square feet (about 10% overall) of her
property along a nearby creek for flood protection;92 and (2) that she
dedicate an additional 15-foot strip of land for a pedestrian/bicycle
pathway. 93 Because the increased impervious surface created by the new
parking lot would increase storm water runoff into the creek, the city
concluded that the dedication of land near the creek was necessary to
protect the 100-year floodplain. 94 In addition, the City determined that
the pedestrian/bicycle path would offset some of the traffic that would be
generated by the new, larger store.95
In evaluating whether the City's requirements constituted a taking, the
Dolan Court first addressed whether a "nexus" existed between the land
exaction and the "'legitimate state interest."' 96 The Court found that
dedicating the land along the creek would help protect the floodplain
from the increased stormwater that would result from paving the parking
lot.97 Similarly, the Court concluded that a new pedestrian/bicycle
pathway would offset some of the traffic caused by doubl.ing the size of
the store. 9 Thus, Nollan's required "nexus" was established.
The Dolan Court, however, did not end its analysis with the finding of
a "nexus." Nollan requires a certain quality of relationship between the
exaction and the impact from the development-it is a qualitative test. 99
Dolan goes one step further by attempting to compare the degree of
exactions to the burdens created by the new development-it requires a
certain quantitative relationship. In describing the necessary relationship,
the Court rejected the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test set
forth in Pioneer
Trust & Savings Bank v. Mount Prospect"0 as too
0
t
"exacting."' The Court also refused to adopt the rational nexus test of
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls..2 or the "reasonable relationship"
91. Id. at 2313.
92. Id. at 2314 (citing App. to Petitioner's Brief at G28-29).
93. Id. at 2314 n.2 (citing App. to Petitioner's Brief at G43).
94. Id. at 2315 (citing App. to Petitioner's Brief at G37).
95. Id. at 2314-15 (citing App. to Petitioner's Brief at G24).
96. Id. at 2317 (quoting Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987)).
97. Id. at2317-18.
98. Id. at 2318.
99. See supra part II.B.
100. 176 N.E.2d 799, 802 (II1. 1961).
101. 114S.Ct.at2319.
102. 137 N.W.2d 442,448 (Wis. 1965), appealdismissed,385 U.S. 4 (1966).
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test. 3 Instead, the Court developed its own "rough proportionality" test
to describe the required quantitative relationship between the exaction
and the impact of the proposed development."
The Court's test requires that exactions produce a benefit roughly
proportional to the burden created by the new development." 5 In
defining "rough proportionality," the Court stated that "[n]o precise
mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some sort of
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."'' 0 6 The
Court concluded that it was unclear to what extent the floodplain
easement would address the increased likelihood of flooding caused by
the parking lot.'0 7 The City also did not make an "individualized
determination," nor "quantify its findings" to support its easement for a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway 0 8 Although the City found that the pathway
"could offset some of the traffic demand," the Court determined that this
finding was insufficient to support the amount of the exaction.0 9
Therefore, the majority rejected the exactions because the City failed to
sufficiently establish both the extent of the impacts caused by Dolan's
proposed development and the degree of the relief that would be
provided by the proposed exactions."0
Procedurally, the Court shifted the burden of proof onto municipalities
to establish that "rough proportionality" has been satisfied."' In
traditional land-use disputes, the party challenging the land-use
regulation bears the burden of proof."2 As a result of Dolan, however,
municipalities must first demonstrate that a sufficient "nexus" exists
between the exaction and the problem created by the development.
Moreover, local governments must then evaluate the degree of the
"nexus" by demonstrating "rough proportionality" between the harm
caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the exaction. To

103. 114 S.Ct. at 2319.
104. Id.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 2320-21.
Id.at 2320-22.
Id.at 2321-22.

110. Id.at 2320-22.
111. Id.at 2320 n.8.
112. Id.
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demonstrate "rough proportionality," local governments must make
"individualized determinations" and somehow "quantify their findings."
3.

Dolan's "Rough Proportionality"Test Applies to Impact Fees

Nollan and Dolan involve dedications of land, not impact fees. While
some commentators contend that development exactions include
dedications of land as well as payments of fees, 1 3 others have raised
doubts over whether Dolan applies to monetary exactions. 4 Neither
Nollan nor Dolan discusses whether its analysis applies to monetary fees.
In attempting to define its "rough proportionality" test, the Dolan Court
cited a number of exaction cases without distinguishing between those
which involved land exactions and those which involved monetary
exactions." 5 Thus, Dolan suggests that the same analysis applies to both
dedications of land and impact fees.
The Court appeared to address the issue in Ehrlich v. City of Culver
City." 6 In Ehrlich, the City imposed a $280,000 impact fee as well as a
$33,220 fee in lieu of a requirement that art be placed on the
development project."7 In vacating and remanding the case to the
California Court of Appeals, the Court concluded that Ehrlich must be
considered in light of Dolan."' The Court's decision implies that impact
fees must be evaluated under the same analysis as the land dedications in
Dolan. Therefore, impact fees also must satisfy the "rough
proportionality" test.
C.

Post-DolanImpact Fee Cases andApplication of the "Rough
Proportionality"Test

Decisions following Dolan advocate a closer relationship between the
impact fee and the proposed development by requiring a detailed analysis
113. Frank & Rhodes, supranote 5,at 2-3.
114. [D]oes Dolan apply to monetary-as opposed to land exactions? In both Nollan and
Dolan, the government demanded land in exchange for the right to use land. What if [the]
government demands instead a high mitigation fee from the landowner? Could it then use that
fee to condemn the property interest it could not have obtained outright?
Letter from the Pacific Legal Foundation, to Editorial Board, Washington Law Review 7 (Oct. 4,
1994) (on file with the Washington Law Review).
115. 114 S. Ct. at2318-20.
116. 114S. Ct. 2731 (1994).
117. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,470 (Ct. App. 1993).
118. 114S.Ct.at2731.
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of the impact of the development and how the fee is calculated." 9 In
Washington, the supreme court has upheld fees that were based on a
detailed study of the impacts of the new development. 2 ' On the other
hand, it has rejected arbitrary fees.' Other state courts also require a
detailed analysis of whether the fee is related to the development.'
Washington impact fee cases after Dolan scrutinize the relationship
between the fee and the development. In Trimen Development Co. v.
King County,'23 the Washington Supreme Court upheld a county
ordinance authorizing the use of impact fees to help pay for parks and
other recreational facilities. The court based its decision on the County's
assessment that the new subdivision would create a need for new park
land. "24
' The court concluded that the fees imposed on the developer were
"reasonably necessary as a direct result of the developer's proposed
development."' "as
Although Trimen appears similar to other Washington cases
invalidating impact fees, the case can be distinguished by the fee
calculation method used. In Trimen, the fees were based on a detailed
park study that included factors such as zoning, projected population,
and assessed value of the land in the area.'2 6 The fees were not
determined by a flat per-lot charge. 27 The detailed park study
demonstrated that the need for more park land was a direct result of the
new development. Moreover, the park study appeared to satisfy Dolan's
requirement for an "individualized determination" of the relationship
between the fee and the impact of the new development. The court
therefore indicated that "rough proportionality" was satisfied. 2 '
119. See, e.g., Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994);
Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 124 Wash. 2d 240, 877 P.2d 176 (1994); J.C. Reeves
Corp. v. Clackamas County, 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Schultz v. City of Grants Pass, 884
P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
120. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187.
121. Henderson Homes, 124 Wash. 2d 240, 877 P.2d 176.
122. See, e.g., J.C. Reeves Corp., 887 P.2d 360; Schultz, 884 P.2d 569.
123. 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994).
124. Id. at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
125. Id. Based on the County's park assessment, the court found that the proposed development
would create a need for 2.52 acres more of park land.
126. Id. at 275, 877 P.2d at 194.
127. Id. at 274-75, 877 P.2d at 194. See also Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 67 Wash.
App. 196, 210-11, 834 P.2d 1071, 1078 (1992) (Agid, J., dissenting) (asserting that straight fee-perlot charge indicates fees imposed without any evaluation of direct impacts of development), rev'd,
124 Wash. 2d 240, 877 P.2d 176 (1994).
128. Trimen, 124 Wash. 2d at 274, 877 P.2d at 194.
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In Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell,2 9 the Washington
Supreme Court determined that the City's park impact fee was
improperly imposed on the developers. As a condition of subdivision
permit approval, the City required that developers pay a predetermined
$400-per-lot fee to help pay for city parks.13 In rejecting the
predetermined fee, the court held that the City failed to identify any
"direct impacts" of the proposed developments on the park system.' In
addition, the court concluded that there were "no documents or records"
introduced by the City that analyzed the direct impacts of the new
development.' 32 The court rejected the fee because the City failed to
quantify its findings
that the new subdivision would have an impact on
33
the park system.1
Oregon, the state in which Dolan originated, also has attempted to
define "rough proportionality." In J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas
County,'34 the Oregon Court of Appeals stated that Dclan requires a
greater degree of specificity between the exaction and the impact caused
by the development.'35 In J. C. Reeves Corp., the court concluded that the
County's findings failed to make comparisons between traffic impacts
and other effects of the subdivision and the improvements required by
the County.'36 The court stated that the County did not support the
imposition of the development conditions with the specificity that Dolan
requires."' Similarly, in Schultz v. City of Grants Pass,'38 the Oregon
Court of Appeals required a greater degree of specificity. In Schultz, the
court rejected the City's exactions because they were based on future
potential development instead of on the impacts cf the current
subdivision project.'39
129. 124 Wash. 2d 240, 877 P.2d 176 (1994).
130. Id.at241, 877 P.2d at 177.
131. Id. at 243, 877 P.2d at 177.
132. "Finding of fact 13: 'Beyond the conclusionary statements contained in the plat approval
conditions for plaintiffs' development, there are no documents or records supporting any analysis by
the City of Bothell of the direct impacts of plaintiffs' developments on the park system."' Id., 877
P.2d at 177-78 (quoting Clerk's Papers at 83).
133. Although the court did not cite Dolan, it appears that documentation or quantification of the
effects of the new development is the type of "individualized determination" thaft the Supreme Court
required in Dolan.
134. 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 364-65.
Id.
Id. at 365.
884 P.2d 569 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).

139. Id. at 573.
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III. DOLAN'S EFFECT ON WASHINGTON IMPACT FEE
STATUTES
While courts have attempted to define "rough proportionality" in
specific cases, Dolan also affects the validity and interpretation of impact
fee statutes. Because "rough proportionality" is required to satisfy the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment, the decision applies to all
development exactions, including impact fees. In light of Dolan's "rough
proportionality" test, Washington impact fee statutes must be analyzed to
determine whether they meet the U.S. Supreme Court's requirements.
Statutes that do not satisfy the "rough proportionality" test should be
invalidated.
The Washington Legislature has authorized four main types of impact
fees. Governmental bodies required to develop comprehensive plans
under the Growth Management Act (GMA)' t4 are authorized to impose
development impact fees 14 ' as well as relocation fees for low-income
tenants. 42 The Local Transportation Act permits local governments to
impose transportation impact fees. 43 In addition, the Legislature
authorized voluntary agreements between developers and municipalities
for the payment of impact fees or dedications of land.'" While
development and transportation impact fees comply with Dolan's test,
voluntary agreements and relocation assistance fees do not adequately
meet the "rough proportionality" standard.
A.

Development Impact Fees Under the Growth Management Act:
§§ 82.02.050-.090

Under Washington's GMA, 45 local governments and municipalities
that choose to or are required to plan for growth can impose impact
fees.' 46 Section 82.02.050 imposes several limitations on development
140. Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.040 (1994).
141. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.050(2) (1994).
142. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(l) (1994).
143. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030 (1994).
144. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020 (1994).
145. One of the main planning goals of the GMA is to "[e]nsure that those public facilities and
services necessary to support development shall be adequate to serve the development at the time the
development is available for occupancy and use without decreasing current service levels below
locally established minimum standards." Wash. Rev. Code § 36.70A.020(12) (1994).
146. By authorizing impact fees under the Growth Management Act, the Legislature intended:
(a) To ensure that adequate facilities are available to serve new growth and development;
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impact fees. The fee must: (1) be "reasonably related to the new
development"; (2) "not exceed a proportionate share of the costs of the
system improvements"; and (3) be used for system imp:rovements that
"reasonably benefit the new development." 47 Moreover., fees must be
refunded if not spent within six years on public facilities intended to
benefit the development. 4 By imposing these restrictions, the
Legislature intended to provide a balance between impact fees and other
sources of public funds. 49
1.

Development Impact Fees Meet the "Rough Proportionality"Test

Although the limitations imposed on development impact fees under
§ 82.02.050 are not described in terms of "rough proportionality," the
limitations appear to meet the test. By requiring fees to be "reasonably
related" to the development, § 82.02.050 appears to address Nollan's
"nexus" requirement that the exaction actually alleviate the burden
created by the development. The municipality must establish that a
reasonable relationship exists between the fee's eventual use and the
burdens attributable to the particular development project. Municipalities
should have little difficulty demonstrating this relationship because the
statute authorizes fees only for use in building roads, schools, parks,
open space, recreation areas, and fire stations.5 ° These public facilities
are almost always directly affected by a large commercial or residential
development.
The statute's limitations also demand the type of "individualized
determinations" required by Dolan's "rough proportionality" test.
Because fees cannot exceed a "proportionate share" of tae costs of the
improvements, 5 ' municipalities must make site-specific determinations
(b) To promote orderly growth and development by establishing standards by which counties,
cities, and towns may require, by ordinance, that new growth and development pay a
proportionate share of the cost of new facilities needed to serve new growth and development;
and
(c) To ensure that impact fees are imposed through established procedures cad criteria so that
specific developments do not pay arbitrary fees or duplicative fees for the same impact.
Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.050(1) (1994).
147. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.050(3)(a)-(c) (1994).
148. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.080(l) (1994).
149. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.050(2).
150. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.090(7), (9) (1994).
151. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.050(l)(b) (1994). A "proportionate share" is defined as "that
portion of the cost of [the] improvements that are reasonably related to the ,ervice demands and
needs of the new development." Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.090(5) (1994).
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of the burdens created by a proposed development. In other words, fees
must be proportionate to the service demands and needs created by the
development. Therefore, the statutory requirements of § 82.02.050
comply with the "rough proportionality" test.
According to Dolan, local governments bear the burden of
demonstrating "rough proportionality" between fees exacted and burdens
created. Municipalities can satisfy the test by applying an impact fee
formula when calculating the actual amount of the exaction. Impact fee
formulas incorporate factors such as the cost of the new improvements,
standard level of service (LOS), t5 2 increase in population, and cost of
existing public facilities. By applying a fee formula, the final impact fee
reflects the additional monetary burden caused by new residential or
commercial developments.' 53

152. Level of service (LOS) standards are the acceptable performance levels for specific services
in a community. Typically, they are set by municipalities to evaluate the service standards for a
particular region or community. For example, LOS for roads is a qualitative measure based on a
scale of A to F, where LOS level A indicates free-flowing traffic and F is a road with extreme delays.
LOS for parks is a standard based on the number of acres of park land per person or per 1000
persons living near the park. The national parks and recreation standard is 10 acres per 1000 persons.
Payingfor Growth 'sImpacts, supra note 1, at 16-17.
153. An example of calculating a park impact fee is the following:
Suppose a new development will create 1500 multiple-family units accommodating 4500
residents. The community's park standard is eight acres per 1000 persons. The last purchase price of
available land was $40,000 per acre for undeveloped land and general recreational facilities
improvement averaged $30,000 an acre for the last fiscal year. Existing general obligation debt
payments (figured on a per-capita basis for persons living in existing multiple-family units) are $30
per year. Present value is based on a life of 25 years and a six percent interest rate. The municipality
also expects half of the park costs to come from state grant funds and bonds. Thus, the calculations
are:
Population = 1500 x 3 = 4500 People
Adopted Acreage Standards = 8 Acres/I 000 People = 0.008 Acres/Person
Per Acre Land Cost = $40,000/Acre
Per Acre Improvement Cost = $30,000/Acre
Cost of Park Acquisition and Improvements = 4500 x 0.008 x ($40,000 + $30,000) =
$2,520,000
Present Value Factor = 12.78
Credits = $30 x 12.78 = $383 per Person
Net Cost = $2,520,000 - ($383 x 4500) = $796,500
Total Impact Fee = $796,500- 0.50($796,500) = $398,250
Impact Fee Per Unit = $398,250/1500 = $266 Per Unit
Id. at 18-19.
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The "ReasonableBenefit" Requirement Is More Restrictive Than
the "Rough Proportionality"Test

Development impact fees under § 82.02.050 also require that fees be
spent on facilities that benefit the development, an element not discussed
in Nollan or Dolan.'54 However, the improvements do not have to solely
benefit the development. As long as there is some benefit to the
development, it does not matter if the general public benefits as well.
Because it is difficult to measure a benefit to the development, expected
use of the facility is the best indicator of whether such a benefit exists. 5
For example, if a local municipality wants to impose an impact fee for
parks, the park should be located near the development so that the
residents of the subdivision will most likely use the park and benefit
from its existence. The fees should not be used for a park across town
because there is little chance that the residents of the subdivision would
use it. Because impact fees under § 82.02.050 are more restrictive than
Dolan's "rough proportionality" test, the statute complies with the
Court's standard while requiring an additional element, a reasonable
benefit requirement.
B.

TransportationImpact Fee: §§ 39.92.010-.040

Washington's Local Transportation Act authorizes transportation
impact fees to offset the demands of growth and new development'56 by

154. Neither Nollan nor Dolan discusses a requirement that exactions benefit the development. In
Nollan, the Court indicated that a public viewing spot on the Nollans' property would satisfy a
"nexus" without any evaluation of whether it would create a benefit for the Nollans. Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 836 (1987). However, it is difficult to see how the
Nollans would benefit from a public viewing spot on their own property. Similarly, in Dolan, the
Court failed to discuss whether Dolan would receive a benefit from the conditions imposed on her
property. The Court stated that a dedication of land for a pedestrian/bicycle pat'lway and land for the
protection of the creek would satisfy a "nexus" requirement. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct.
2309, 2317-18 (1994). However, it is hani to imagine Dolan receiving a benefit from a
pedestrian/bicycle pathway as, presumably, few of her customers would arrive at her plumbing store
by bicycle. Furthermore, Dolan would have received no benefit from a dedication of land near the
creek. If the City was able to obtain all the land running near the creek, there would have been some
flood protection for her property. However, Dolan's dedication of land, absent additional dedications
from neighboring landowners, would provide her property with no benefit.
155. James C. Nichols & Arthur C. Nelson, The Rational Nexus Test and Appropriate
Development Impact Fees, in Development Impact Fees, supra note 7, at 177.
156. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.010 (1994) provides:
Purpose. The legislature finds that there is an increasing need for local and regional
transportation improvements as the result of both existing demands and the: foreseeable future
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mitigating off-site transportation impacts.' Fees can be imposed only
under the limited circumstances provided in the statute. First, a
development's transportation impacts must be measured for their "pro
rata share" of the improvements being funded. 8 Second, the fees must
be "reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed
development."' 5 9 Moreover, the collected fees must be spent within six
years or be refunded.' The statute prohibits fees for projects that are
incapable of being carried out for lack of funds or other foreseeable
problems.' 6 '
1.

TransportationImpact Fees Satisfy "Rough Proportionality"

The statutory requirements for transportation impact fees should meet
the Nollan and Dolan tests. The language of the transportation impact fee
statute is similar to "rough proportionality" and mandates the type of
"individualized determinations" Dolan requires. A "nexus" is established
by satisfying the requirement that the fee must be "reasonably necessary
as a direct result of the proposed development."' 62 The "direct result" is
measured by calculating the impact that will be created by the vehicles
and pedestrians traveling to and from the development.'63 The impact can
be measured by determining whether there is any affect on the

demands from economic growth and development within the state, including residential,
commercial, and industrial development.
157. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.020(6) (1994).
158. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(4) (1994).
159. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.020(3) (1994) ("'Direct result of the proposed development'
means those quantifiable transportation impacts that are caused by vehicles or pedestrians whose trip
origin or destination is the proposed development.").
160. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(5) (1994).
161. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(8) (1994).
162, Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(4).
163. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.020(3).
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transportation LOS. 1" As long as the new subdivision affects the LOS, a
"nexus" is satisfied.
Moreover, transportation impact fees demand the site-specific
determination required by the "rough proporticnality" test.
Transportation impacts must be measured as a pro rata share of the
improvements being funded by the fee. 165 "Pro rata" is generally defined
as in proportion or proportionate.' 6 The developer's fees must therefore
be proportionate to the cost of the improvements. A road or
transportation impact fee formula, or some similer site-specific
determination, would satisfy Dolan's test because the arount of the fee
67
would be calculated in proportion to the cost of the development.
2.

TransportationImprovements Must Benefit a Specific Geographic
Boundary

The Local Transportation Act also mandates that fees be exacted only
within a limited geographic boundary that will be-aefit from the
improvements.' 6 Under the local transportation program, municipalities
must identify a limited geographic region. Fees imposed on new
development must be spent within the boundary in which it is located.
Thus, transportation fees impose a benefit requirement similar to that
164. Level of Service Definitions for Intersections and Highways with Signets:
LOS

Signalized Intersection

Highway

A

Uncongested operations

Free flow of vehicles in the traffic stream

B

Uncongested operations

Higher speed range of stable flow,
volume 50% of capacity

C

Light congestion, occasional backups

D

Significant congestion of critical approaches but intersection functional
Severe congestion with long standing
back-ups on critical approaches

Stable flow with volumes not exceeding
75% of capacity
Upper end of stable flow conditions,
volumes do not.exceed 90% of capacity

E
F

Total breakdown, stop-and-go

Unstable flow at roadway capacity,
operating speeds 30--25 mph or less
Stop-and-go traffic, operating speed less
than 30 mph

PublicNeeds, supra note 2, at 114.
165. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(4).
166. Webster's New World Dictionary 1140 (2d ed. 1982).
167. For road impact fees, the Washington Department of Community Development recommends
factors such as LOS, expected use of the roads, amount of new road required, and the cost of the
needed right-of-way. Payingfor Growth's Impacts, supra note 1, at 16.
168. Wash. Rev. Code § 39.92.030(1) (1994) ("The program shall identify the geographic
boundaries of the entire area or areas generally benefited by the proposed off-site transportation
improvements and within which transportation impact fees will be imposed under this chapter.").
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imposed on development impact fees under § 82.02.050. Because the
transportation impact fee statute imposes an additional benefit
requirement, it is more restrictive than what the "rough proportionality"
test requires.
C.

Voluntary Agreementsfor Impact Fees or Dedicationsof Land:
§ 82.02.020

The Washington Legislature, in amending § 82.02.020 in 1982,
provided that municipalities could collect fees or receive dedications of
land through voluntary agreements with developers. 6 9 Although
§ 82.02.020 generally prohibits impact fees except as specifically
authorized by statute, 7 ' impact fees or dedications of land are permitted
as long as the municipality can demonstrate that they are "reasonably
7
necessary as a direct result of the proposed development."' '
Municipalities that receive payments pursuant to voluntary agreements
must hold the funds in a reserve account and use them to fund the capital
improvements identified by the parties." Moreover, the fees 7must be
spent within five years of collection or be refunded with interest.1 1
1.

Voluntary Agreements Under Cobb v. Snohomish County and
Trimen Development Co. v. King County Are Not Truly
"Voluntary"

A voluntary agreement implies that the developer is given a choice
between paying or not paying the fee. The word "voluntary" generally is
defined as given or done of one's free will or choice. 74 If agreements
under § 82.02.020 are truly voluntary, then Dolan's requirements are
169. The statute "does not preclude dedications of land or easements within the proposed
development or plat which the county, city, town, or other municipal corporation can demonstrate
are reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development or plat to which the
dedication of land or easement is to apply." Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020 (1994).
In addition, the statute "does not prohibit voluntary agreements with counties, cities, towns, or
other municipal corporations that allow a payment in lieu of a dedication of land or to mitigate a
direct impact that has been identified as a consequence of a proposed development, subdivision, or
plat." Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020.
170. The statute's general prohibition does not apply to development impact fees under

§§ 82.02.050-.090, transportation impact fees under §§ 39.92.010-040, and tenant relocation
assistance under §§ 59.18.440-.450. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020.
171. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020.
172. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020(l) (1994).
173. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020(2), (3) (1994).
174. Webster's New World Dictionary 1591 (2d ed. 1982).
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inapplicable because no constitutional provision preventS a person from
voluntarily choosing to pay a fee or dedicate land to the government.
However, Washington courts have interpreted such agreements as being
voluntary even though the payment of fees or dedication of land under75
§ 82.02.020 was not truly "voluntary" in the literal sense of the word.
In fact, developers were forced to pay a fee or dedicate: land to obtain
approval for proposed development.
Initially, the Washington Court of Appeals held in Cobb that
agreements are "voluntary" when a developer has a choice of either
paying the fee or losing permit approval. 76 However, this presents no
viable choice because the developer's only option is to pay the fee or
have the requested permit denied.' 7 In Trimen, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that the developer is presented with a "viable choice"78
when faced with the option of either paying the fee or dedicating land.'
In both cases, the developer is not given the choice of actually refusing
to pay the fee. If developers are compelled to either pay a fee or dedicate
Cobb and Trimen, must
land, voluntary agreements, as interpreted under
179
comply with the "rough proportionality" test.
2.

The Requirementsfor Voluntary Agreements Do Not Address the
"Rough Proportionality"Test

Although a "nexus" is satisfied under § 82.02.020, the statute does not
adequately address Dolan's requirements. Voluntary agreements must be
80
"reasonably necessary as a direct result of the proposed development.
Thus, the local government must identify how a reasonable relationship
exists between the need for the voluntary agreement and the burden
created by the development. New development generally will affect all or
175. See Trimen Dev. Co. v. King County, 124 Wash. 2d 261, 877 P.2d 187 (1994); Cobb v.
Snohomish County, 64 Wash. App. 451, 829 P.2d 169 (1991), review denied, 119 Wash. 2d 1012,
833 P.2d 386 (1992).
176. 64 Wash. App. at 457-58, 829 P.2d at 173-74. See also Martha Lester, Subdivision
Exactions in Washington: The Controversy over Imposing Fees on Developers, 59 Wash. L. Rev.
289, 297-98 (1984) (noting that developer is freed with "voluntary" choice when only option is to
pay fee or have permit denied).
177. 64 Wash. App. at 464, 829 P.2d at 177 (Agid, J., dissenting).
178. 124 Wash. 2d at 272, 877 P.2d at 193.
179. But see Henderson Homes, Inc. v. City of Bothell, 124 Wash. 2d 240, 246, 877 P.2d 176,
179 (1994). In Henderson Homes, the Washington Supreme Court, contrary to Cobb, indicated that
agreements under § 82.02.020 are not voluntary when the developer is given only the choice of
paying a fee or losing permit approval.
180. Wash. Rev. Code § 82.02.020.
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some of the public facilities and services located near the development
by increasing the demand for those facilities and services. As long as a
municipality can demonstrate that the use of the fees or land will be used
to alleviate the problems created by the proposed development, the
"nexus" requirement will be satisfied.
Although voluntary agreements meet Nollan's "nexus" test, they do
not address Dolan's requirement that fees be based on some
"individualized determination.'
Unlike the statutes authorizing
development and transportation impact fees, the statute governing
voluntary agreements does not mandate that fees cannot exceed a
"proportionate" or "pro rata" share of the costs of the improvements.'8 2
Thus, the requirements of § 82.02.020 do not meet the customized, sitespecific fee determination envisioned by the Dolan Court.
3.

Washington Courts ShouldRequire "Rough Proportionality"
Between Voluntary Agreements and New Development

Because voluntary agreements do not statutorily meet Dolan's
requirements, courts should analyze these cases by applying the "rough
proportionality" test on a case-by-case basis. Specifically. Washington
courts should ensure that municipalities make the proper site-specific
quantifications required by Dolan. Thus, the Washington Supreme Court
properly analyzed the voluntary agreements in Trimen and Henderson
Homes. In Trimen, the court noted that the County conducted a
comprehensive park study and that the fees collected were appropriately
related to the size of the specific project. 3 On the other hand, in
Henderson Homes, the court concluded that there was no evidence of the
impact the proposed development would have on the City's park
facilities. 4 Although the court did not specifically cite Dolan's test, in
each case it scrutinized the local government's attempt to measure the
impacts of the developments. The court's decisions indicate that
municipalities are required to make a site-specific determination of the
burdens created by a new development when entering voluntary
agreements with developers.

181. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 114 S. Ct. 2309,2319 (1994).
182. See Wash. Rev. Code §§ 82.02.050(1)(b), 39.92.030 (1994).
183. 124 Wash. 2d 261,273-74, 877 P.2d 187, 194 (1994).
184. 124 Wash. 2d 240, 245-46, 877 P.2d 176, 177-78 (1994).
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Relocation Assistance Fees: § 59.18.440

Municipalities, required to plan under the GMA, have the authority to
impose relocation assistance fees' 85 for low-income tenants.8 6 Local
governments can assess fees on property owners upon the demolition,
rehabilitation, or change in use of residential property in an assisted
housing development.' 87 Thus, if a landlord wanted to demolish a lowincome housing complex and build a new residential development, a
municipality could impose relocation assistance fees or, the developer.
The fees may include various costs associated with relocation, such as
moving expenses, security and damage deposits, utility connection fees,
and additional rent and utility costs for a year. 88 Relocation assistance
fees cannot exceed $2000 for each residence displaced by the property
owner and cannot exceed one-half of the tenant's total relocation costs.'89
The relationship between the relocation fees and the landlord's use of
property does not satisfy Nollan's "nexus" requirement. The Washington
Supreme Court has consistently rejected the notion that individual
property owners are responsible for a community's low-income housing
problem. 9 ' In Guimont v. Clarke, the court examined the validity of the
Mobile Home Relocation Assistance Act which required property owners
to pay relocation fees for displaced mobile home owners. 9' Although the
court applied a substantive due process analysis, it determined that the
main problem was not the closing of the mobile home park, but the lack
of low-income housing and the low-income status of mobile home
residents.'92 Thus, the court concluded that the burden was not created by
the actions of the property owner but by society as a whole.'93
185. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(1) (1994).
186. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(2) (1994) ("'[L]ow income tenants' means tenants whose
combined total income per dwelling unit is at or below fifty percent of the median income, adjusted
for family size, in the county where the tenants reside.").
187. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(1) ("'[A]ssisted housing development' means a multifamily
rental housing development that either receives government assistance and is defined as federally
assisted housing in RCW 59.28.020, or that receives other federal, state, or local government
assistance and is subject to use restrictions.").
188. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(3)(a)-(d) (1994).
189. Wash. Rev. Code § 59.18.440(4)(a), (b) (1994).
190. See, e.g., Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 611, 854 P.2d 1, 15 (1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1216 (1994); Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d 318, 331, cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wash. 2d 1, 22, 829 P.2d 765, 777,
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992); San Telmo Assocs. v. City of Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 24-25,
735 P.2d 673, 675 (1987).
191. 121 Wash. 2d at 591-92, 854 P.2d at 4.
192. The Washington Supreme Court stated:
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Similar reasoning can be applied to relocation assistance fees for lowincome tenants under § 59.18.440. The fees do not address a burden
caused by the new development.'94 The problem instead is created by the
lack of adequate affordable housing. The shortage of low-income
housing and the financial burden of the residents is not the direct result
of the property owner's actions. Instead, the problem is created by the
community's failure to resolve the affordable housing dilemma. Because
the fees do not alleviate any problem created by the property owner,
no
"nexus" exists between the fees and the actions of the landlord.195
IV. CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dolan provides a new standard
for evaluating impact fees. Under Dolan, municipalities must
demonstrate "rough proportionality" by quantifying the degree to which
the exactions alleviate the burdens created by the new development. In
Washington, development fees under sections 82.02.050-.090 of the
Washington Revised Code and transportation fees under §§ 39.92.010040 satisfy the site-specific determinations required by Dolan. In fact,
these statutes are more restrictive because they demand an additional
benefit requirement not addressed by the Dolan Court. On the other
hand, voluntary agreements under § 82.02.020 and relocation assistance
under § 59.18.440 do not adequately address the "rough proportionality"
test. Voluntary agreements may be valid as long as Washington courts
evaluate the statute in light of Dolan's requirements. However,
relocation assistance fees do not satisfy Nollan's "nexus" test. Thus,
under a Nollan and Dolan development exaction analysis, Washington
courts should invalidate relocation assistance fees.

The costs of relocating mobile home owners, like the related and more general problems of
maintaining an adequate supply of low income housing, are more properly the burden of society
as a whole than of individual property owners. While the closing of a mobile home park is the
immediate cause of the need for relocation assistance, it is the general unavailability of low
income housing and the low income status of many of the mobile home owners that is the more
fundamental reason why the relocation assistance is necessary.
Id. at 611, 854 P.2d at 15.
193. Id.
194. Developers contend that there is no "link" between new development and low-income
housing. Porter, supra note 7, at 74-75.
195. But see Public Needs, supra note 2, at 177-89 (concluding from Sacramento Housing Nexus
Analysis that nexus exists between employees of various commercial and industrial buildings and
number of low-income employee households directly associated with buildings).

